(1) An independent review committee must have at least three members.

(2) The size of the independent review committee is to be determined by the manager, with a view to facilitating effective decision-making, and may only be changed by the manager.

(3) Every independent review committee member must be independent.

(4) An independent review committee must appoint a member as Chair.

(5) The Chair of an independent review committee is responsible for managing the mandate, and responsibilities and functions, of the independent review committee.

Commentary

1. To ensure its effectiveness, a manager should consider the workload of the IRC when determining its size. The CSA expect that the manager will seek the input of the IRC prior to changing the size of the IRC.

2. The CSA anticipate that the Chair of the IRC will lead IRC meetings, foster communication among IRC members, and ensure the IRC carries out its responsibilities in a timely and effective manner.

The CSA expect the IRC Chair will be the primary person to interact with the manager on issues relating to the investment fund. An IRC Chair and the manager may agree to have regular communication as a way for the IRC Chair to keep informed of the operations of the investment fund between meetings, and of any significant events relating to the investment fund.

3. The requirement that all members of the IRC be independent does not preclude the IRC from consulting with others who can help the members understand matters that are beyond their specific expertise, or help them understand industry practices or trends, for example.

(1) A decision by the independent review committee on a conflict of interest matter or any other matter that securities legislation requires the independent review committee to review requires the agreement of a majority of the independent review committee’s members.

(2) If, for any reason, an independent review committee has two members, a decision by the independent review committee must be unanimous.

(3) An independent review committee with one member may not make a decision.

Commentary

1. This section requires a decision of the members of the IRC to represent the majority. Should the IRC find itself with two members, subsection (2) permits the IRC to continue to make decisions on conflict of interest matters provided the remaining two members agree.

(1) The manager may set the initial compensation and expenses of an independent review committee that is appointed under section 3.2 or subsection 3.3(5).

(2) Subject to subsection (1), the independent review committee must set reasonable compensation and proper expenses for its members.

(3) When setting its compensation and expenses under subsection (2), the independent review committee must consider

(a) the independent review committee’s most recent assessment of its compensation under paragraph 4.2(2)(b); and

(b) the manager’s recommendations, if any.

Commentary

1. This section permits the manager to determine the amount and type of compensation and expenses the IRC members will initially receive. To avoid undue influence from the manager, subsection (2) requires that, subsequent to the initial setting of compensation and other than in the unusual circumstance described in subsection 3.3(5), members of the IRC have the sole authority for determining their compensation. The Instrument permits the manager to recommend to the members of the IRC the amount and type of compensation to be paid, and requires the IRC to consider that recommendation.

2. The CSA expect the IRC and the manager to decide the IRC’s compensation in a manner consistent with good governance practices. Among the factors the IRC and manager should consider when determining the appropriate level of compensation are the following:

• • the number, nature and complexity of the investment funds and the fund families for which the IRC acts;
  • the nature and extent of the workload of each member of the IRC, including the commitment of time and energy that is expected from each member;
  • industry best practices, including industry averages and surveys on IRC compensation; and
  • the best interests of the investment fund.

3. The CSA expect that the IRC and the manager will discuss any instance where the IRC disagrees with the manager’s recommendations under paragraph (3)(b), in an attempt to reach an agreement that is satisfactory to both the IRC and the manager.

(1) An individual ceases to be a member of an independent review committee when

(a) the investment fund terminates;

(b) the manager of the investment fund changes, unless the new manager is an affiliate of the former manager; or

(c) there is a change of control of the manager of the investment fund.

(2) An individual ceases to be a member of an independent review committee if

(a) the individual resigns;

(b) the individual’s term of office expires and the member is not reappointed;

(c) a majority of the other members of the independent review committee vote to remove the individual; or

(d) a majority of the securityholders of the investment fund vote to remove the individual at a special meeting called for that purpose by the manager.

(3) An individual ceases to be a member of the independent review committee if the individual is

(a) no longer independent within the meaning of section 1.4 and the cause of the member’s non-independence is not temporary for which the member can recuse himself or herself;

(b) of unsound mind and has been so found by a court in Canada or elsewhere;

(c) bankrupt;

(d) prohibited from acting as a director or officer of any issuer in Canada;

(e) subject to any penalties or sanctions made by a court relating to provincial and territorial securities legislation; or

(f) a party to a settlement agreement with a provincial or territorial securities regulatory authority.

(4) If an individual ceases to be a member of the independent review committee due to a circumstance described in subsection (2), the manager must, as soon as practicable, notify the securities regulatory authority or regulator of the date and the reason the individual ceased to be a member.

(5) The notification referred to in subsection (4) is satisfied if it is made to the investment fund’s principal regulator.

(6) The notice of a meeting of securityholders of an investment fund called to consider the removal of a member under paragraph (2)(d) must comply with the notice requirements set out in section 5.4 of National Instrument 81-102 Investment Funds.

(7) For any member of the independent review committee who receives notice or otherwise learns of a meeting of securityholders called to consider the removal of the member under paragraph (2)(d),

(a) the member may submit to the manager a written statement giving reasons for opposing the removal; and

(b) the manager must, as soon as practicable, send a copy of the statement referred to in paragraph (a) to every securityholder entitled to receive notice of the meeting and to the member unless the statement is included in or attached to the notice documents required by subsection (6).

Commentary

1. The CSA do not anticipate that the securityholder vote contemplated in paragraph 3.10(2)(d) will be routine. When a manager calls a meeting of securityholders to consider the removal of a member, subsection (7) requires that the member will have an opportunity to respond to the manager’s notice.

2. In the circumstances described in paragraphs 3.10(1)(b) and (c), all members of the IRC will cease to be members. This does not preclude the new manager from reappointing the former members of the IRC under subsection 3.3(5).

3. Paragraph 3.10(3)(a) is meant to exclude a situation where a member may face, or be perceived to face, a conflict of interest with respect to a specific conflict of interest matter the IRC is considering.

(1) The manager and independent review committee must provide orientation consisting of educational or informational programs that enable a new independent review committee member to understand

(a) the role of the independent review committee and its members collectively; and

(b) the role of the individual member.

(2) The manager may provide a member of the independent review committee with educational or informational programs, as the manager considers useful or necessary, that enable the member to understand the nature and operation of the manager’s and investment fund’s businesses.

(3) The independent review committee may reasonably supplement the educational and informational programs provided to its members under this section.

Commentary

1. The CSA expect members of the IRC to regularly participate in educational or informational programs that may be useful to the members in understanding and fulfilling their duties.

Section 3.15 sets out only the minimum educational programs that a manager and IRC are expected to provide for members of the IRC. Educational activities could include presentations, seminars or discussion groups conducted by:

• • personnel of the investment fund or manager,
  • outside experts,
  • industry groups,
  • representatives of the investment fund’s various service providers, and
  • educational organizations and institutions.

2. The CSA expect a discussion of a member’s role referred to in paragraph (1)(b) to include a reference to the commitment of time and energy that is expected from the member.

Before a member of the independent review committee is appointed, the manager or the independent review committee, as the case may be, must consider

(a) the competencies and skills the independent review committee, as a whole, should possess;

(b) the competencies and skills of each other member of the independent review committee; and

(c) the competencies and skills the prospective member would bring to the independent review committee.

Commentary

1. Section 3.5 sets out the criteria the manager and the IRC must consider before appointing a member of the IRC. Subject to these requirements, the manager and the IRC may establish nominating criteria in addition to those set out in this section.

An investment fund must have an independent review committee.

Commentary

1. A manager is expected to establish an IRC using a structure that is appropriate for the investment funds it manages, having regard to the expected workload of that committee. For example, a manager may establish one IRC for each of the investment funds it manages, for several of its investment funds, or for all of its investment funds.

2. This Instrument does not prevent investment funds from sharing an IRC with investment funds managed by another manager. This Instrument also does not prevent a third party from offering IRCs for investment funds. Managers of smaller families of investment funds may find these to be cost-effective ways to establish IRCs for their investment funds.

The term of office of a member of an independent review committee must be not less than 1 year and not more than 3 years, and must be set by the manager or the independent review committee, as the case may be, at the time the member is appointed.

Commentary

1. To ensure continuity and continued independence from the manager, the CSA recommend that the terms of all IRC members be staggered.

(1) An independent review committee must fill a vacancy on the independent review committee as soon as practicable.

(2) A member whose term has expired, or will soon expire, may be reappointed by the other members of the independent review committee.

(3) In filling a vacancy on the independent review committee or reappointing a member of the independent review committee, the independent review committee must consider the manager’s recommendations, if any.

(4) A member may not be reappointed for a term or terms of office that, if served, would result in the member serving on the independent review committee for longer than 6 years, unless the manager agrees to the reappointment.

(5) If, for any reason, an independent review committee has no members, the manager must appoint a member to fill each vacancy as soon as practicable.

Commentary

1. Consistent with the manager’s role to appoint the first members of an IRC, if at any time the IRC has no members, the manager will also appoint the replacement members. The CSA anticipate that the circumstances contemplated in subsection (5) will occur rarely, such as in the event of a change of manager or change in control of the manager. In these circumstances, managers should consider their timely disclosure obligations under securities legislation.

2. The manager may suggest candidates and may provide assistance to the IRC in the selection and recruitment process when a vacancy arises. Subsection (3) requires the IRC to consider the manager’s recommendation, if any, when filling a vacancy or reappointing a member of the IRC.

The CSA believe that allowing the IRC to select its own members and decide the term a member can serve will foster independent-minded committees that will be focussed on the best interests of the investment fund. The CSA also consider the members of the IRC to be best-positioned to judge the manner in which a prospective member can contribute to the effectiveness of the IRC.

3. The maximum term limit of 6 years specified in subsection (4) for a member to serve on an investment fund’s IRC is intended to enhance the independence and effectiveness of the IRC. An IRC may reappoint a member beyond the maximum term, but only with the agreement of the manager.

(1) In this section, “member” means:

(a) a member of the independent review committee;

(b) a former member of the independent review committee; and

(c) the heirs, executors, administrators or other legal representatives of the estate of an individual in (a) or (b).

(2) An investment fund and manager may indemnify a member against all costs, charges and expenses, including an amount paid to settle an action or satisfy a judgment, reasonably incurred by the person in respect of any civil, criminal, administrative, investigative or other proceeding in which the member is involved because of being or having been a member.

(3) An investment fund and manager may advance moneys to a member for the costs, charges and expenses of a proceeding referred to in subsection (2). The member must repay the moneys if the member does not fulfill the conditions of subsection (4).

(4) An investment fund and manager may not indemnify a member under subsection (2) unless

(a) the member acted honestly and in good faith, with a view to the best interests of the investment fund; and

(b) in the case of a criminal or administrative action or proceeding that is enforced by a monetary penalty, the member had reasonable grounds for believing that the individual’s conduct was lawful.

(5) Despite subsection (2), a member referred to in that subsection is entitled to an indemnity from the investment fund in respect of all costs, charges and expenses reasonably incurred by the member in connection with the defence of any civil, criminal, administrative, investigative or other proceeding to which the member is subject because of the member’s association with the investment fund as described in subsection (2), if the member seeking indemnity

(a) was not judged by the court or other competent authority to have committed any fault or omitted to do anything that ought to have been done; and

(b) fulfills the conditions set out in subsection (4).

(6) An investment fund and manager may purchase and maintain insurance for the benefit of any member referred to in subsection (2) against any liability incurred by the member in his or her capacity as a member.

Commentary

1. This Instrument requires that members of an IRC be accountable for their actions. At the same time, this section does not prevent an investment fund or a manager from limiting a member’s financial exposure through insurance and indemnification.

2. This section permits an investment fund and the manager to indemnify and purchase insurance coverage for the members of the IRC on terms comparable to those applicable to directors of corporations. The broad goals underlying the indemnity provisions are to allow for reimbursement for reasonable good faith behaviour, thereby discouraging the hindsight application of perfection to the IRC’s actions.

Under this section, the investment fund is required to indemnify an IRC member who has been sued and has successfully defended the action, subject to certain conditions. If the IRC member does not defend the action successfully, the investment fund and manager may indemnify the member in certain circumstances. The intention of indemnity is to encourage responsible behaviour yet still permit enough leeway to attract strong candidates.

The two conditions which must be satisfied in either instance under this section for an IRC member to be indemnified are:

• • The IRC member must have acted in a manner consistent with his or her fiduciary duty with respect to the action or matter for which the IRC member is seeking the indemnification; and the IRC member must have had reasonable grounds for believing that his or her conduct was lawful.
  • The CSA expect any such coverage to be on reasonable commercial terms.

3. It is open to members of the IRC to negotiate contractual indemnities with the manager and the investment fund provided the protection is permissible under this section.

(1) Every member of an independent review committee, in exercising his or her powers and discharging his or her duties related to the investment fund, and, for greater certainty, not to any other person, as a member of the independent review committee must

(a) act honestly and in good faith, with a view to the best interests of the investment fund; and

(b) exercise the degree of care, diligence and skill that a reasonably prudent person would exercise in comparable circumstances.

(2) Every member of an independent review committee must comply with this Instrument and the written charter of the independent review committee required under section 3.6.

(3) A member of the independent review committee does not breach paragraph (1)(b), if the member exercised the care, diligence and skill that a reasonably prudent person would exercise in comparable circumstances, including reliance in good faith on

(a) a report or certification represented as full and true to the independent review committee by the manager or an entity related to the manager; or

(b) a report of a person whose profession lends credibility to a statement made by the person.

(4) A member of the independent review committee has complied with his or her duties under paragraph (1)(a) if the member has relied in good faith on

(a) a report or certification represented as full and true to the independent review committee by the manager or an entity related to the manager; or

(b) a report of a person whose profession lends credibility to a statement made by the person.

Commentary

1. The standard of care for IRC members under this section is consistent with the special relationship between the IRC and the investment fund.

The CSA consider the role of the members of the IRC to be similar to corporate directors, though with a much more limited mandate, and therefore we would expect any defences available to corporate directors to also be available to IRC members.

2. The CSA consider the best interests of the investment fund referred to in paragraph (1)(a) to generally be consistent with the interests of the securityholders in the investment fund as a whole.

3. It is not the intention of the CSA to create a duty of care on the part of the IRC to any other person under paragraph (1)(b).

The investment fund must pay from the assets of its fund all reasonable costs and expenses reasonably incurred in the compliance of this Instrument.

Commentary

1. A manager is expected to allocate the costs associated with the IRC on an equitable and reasonable basis amongst the investment funds for which the IRC acts.

This Instrument does not prohibit a manager from reimbursing the investment fund for any of the costs associated with compliance with this Instrument. It is expected that the prospectus will disclose whether or not the manager will reimburse the investment fund.

2. The CSA do not expect costs that the manager or investment fund would ordinarily incur in the operation of the investment fund without the presence of the IRC (for example, rent) to be charged to the investment fund under this section. Among the costs the CSA expect will be charged to the investment fund under this section are the following:

• • the compensation and expenses payable to the members of the IRC and to any independent counsel and other advisers employed by the IRC;
    
    
  • the costs of the orientation and continuing education of the members of the IRC; and
    
    
  • the costs and expenses associated with a special meeting of securityholders called by the manager to remove a member or members of the IRC.

The manager must appoint each member of an investment fund’s first independent review committee.

(1) An independent review committee has authority to

(a) request information it determines useful or necessary from the manager and its officers to carry out its duties;

(b) engage independent counsel and other advisors it determines useful or necessary to carry out its duties;

(c) set reasonable compensation and proper expenses for any independent counsel and other advisors engaged by the independent review committee; and

(d) delegate to a subcommittee of at least three members of the independent review committee any of its functions, except the removal of a member under paragraph 3.10(2)(c).

(2) If the independent review committee delegates to a subcommittee under paragraph (1)(d) any of its functions, the subcommittee must report on its activities to the independent review committee at least annually.

(3) Despite any other provision in this Instrument, an independent review committee may communicate directly with the securities regulatory authority or regulator with respect to any matter.

Commentary

1. The CSA recognize that utilizing the manager’s staff and industry experts may be important to help the members of the IRC deal with matters that are beyond the level of their expertise, or help them understand different practices among investment funds.

While this Instrument does not require legal counsel or other advisers for the IRC to be independent of the manager or the investment fund, there may be instances when the members of the IRC believe they need access to counsel or advisers who are free from conflicting loyalties. Paragraph (1)(b) gives the IRC the discretion and authority to hire independent legal counsel and other advisers. The CSA expect that the IRC will use independent advisors selectively and only to assist, not replace, IRC decision-making. The CSA do not anticipate that IRCs will routinely use external counsel and other advisers.

2. Paragraph (1)(d) is intended to allow an IRC of more than three members to delegate any of its functions, except the removal of an IRC member, to a subcommittee of at least three members. The CSA expect in such instances that the written charter of the IRC will include a defined mandate and reporting requirements for any subcommittee.

The CSA do not consider delegation by the IRC of a function to a subcommittee to absolve the IRC from its responsibility for the function.

3. Subsection (3) specifies that the IRC may inform the securities regulatory authority or regulator of any concerns or issues that it may not otherwise be required to report. For example, the IRC may be concerned if very few matters have been referred by the manager for review, or it may have found, or have reasonable grounds to suspect, a breach of securities legislation has occurred. However, the IRC has no obligation to report matters other than those prescribed by this Instrument or elsewhere in securities legislation.

4. The CSA do not consider that this section or this Instrument prevents the manager from communicating with the securities regulatory authorities with respect to any matter.